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DEATH PENALTY
In 1972, there were over 600 men in our nation's prisons living on
"borrowed" time.' All were awaiting execution under death sentences
previously imposed. Truly remarkable strategy on the part of lawyers,
however, has prevented the execution of any person in this country since
June 2, 1967.2 Then on June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme
Court decided Furman v. Georgia.3 That decision was a logical continu-
ation of the strategies that helped produce it. In a decision that required
nine separate opinions, the Court held the death penalty, as currently
imposed, to be violateive of the eighth amendment's ban against cruel
and unusual punishment.
Although Furman struck down the death penalty in thirty-nine states,
the District of Columbia and under the federal statutory structure, 4 the
controversy still rages over its exact impact. Some legal scholars believe
nothing less than a total restructuring of our entire system of criminal
justice will conform to the mandate of Furman. Others are convinced a
mandatory death penalty that eliminates discretion is still permissible. 5
Ilinois was one of the many states affected by the Furman decision.
When Furman was decided, Illinois law permitted the death penalty for
only three offenses: murder,6 aggravated kidnapping for ransom, 7 and
treason.8 Most notably, under the Illinois provision, unless the defendant
chose a jury, the trial judge had complete discretion whether or not to
impose the death penalty. If a jury was chosen, death could only be
imposed if the jury so recommended, and the judge agreed.9 The discre-
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 417 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
2. Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death Penalty: The Strategy Behind Fur-
man, 82 YALE L.J. 1111 (1973). For an interesting in-depth analysis of the strate-
gies used see M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5. Ehrhardt, The Aftermath of Furman: The Florida Experience, 64 J. CluM.
L.C. & P.S. 2 (1973).
6. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (Supp. 1972).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-2(b)(1) (Supp. 1972).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 30-1(c) (Supp. 1972).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(b) (Supp. 1972).
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tion inherent in the Illinois scheme caused it to be specifically voided
in Moore v. Illinois.10
To fill the vacuum created by Furman and Moore, the Illinois legisla-
ture passed two mandatory death penalty provisions for murder in the
closing days of its first 1973 session. The first bill, House Bill 20,
cleared the legislature on June 27, 1973.11 As originally introduced,
that Bill provided for a mandatory death penalty if a murder fell into
one of eight categories. 12  It also provided for automatic review by the
Pardon and Parole Board so that a recommendation could be made to the
Governor whether to exercise executive clemency. However, due to the
pressures affecting all legislation,' 3 the Bill underwent major surgery.
The result was a bill that provided for the automatic death penalty if the
trier of fact finds that the murder is of any peace officer, fireman, or
correctional official engaged in the performance of his duties or the mur-
der is committed by a person who has previously been convicted of mur-
der. The provision for review by the Pardon and Parole Board was elimi-
nated.
The Bill required the "trier of fact"' 4 upon conviction of murder to
make special written findings of fact as to whether the murder falls into
either of the two categories mentioned above. If so, the mandatory sen-
tence was death.' 5 It is clear that the Bill provided for a mandatory
death penalty only for murder under certain circumstances. However,
the Bill retains language apparently permitting the death penalty, as
previously imposed,' for other Class 1 felonies.' 7 Whether in response
10. 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972).
11. H.B. 20, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973), sponsored by Rep. R.D. Cun-
ningham (R.-Lawrenceville) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 20].
12. Id. § l(b). Murder: 1) of any policeman or fireman; 2) committed for
money; 3) of a person during a known public appearance; 4) by a convicted mur-
derer; 5) by someone under life sentence; 6) during a forcible felony; 7) during a
kidnapping; and 8) during a hijacking.
13. It was believed that the Governor would not sign an overly broad bill.
And the provision explicitly providing for executive clemency smacked too much
of the discretion frowned upon in Furman.
14. Although the Bill as originally proposed defined such terms as "assassina-
tion" and "hijacking," "trier of fact" was not defined in either of the Bills. Prob-
lems seem certain to arise if the jury is required to make "special written findings
of fact."
15. Although the Bill does not explicitly provide for executive clemency, that
possibility is still present. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12.
16. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(b) (Supp. 1972).
17. The language of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(b) (Supp. 1972) is
retained for offenses other than murder which provide for sentences of death,: for
example, aggravated kidnapping for ransom and treason.
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to their uncertainty about the mandatory death penalty as created, or
possibly in response to retention of the death penalty for other offenses,
the legislators included provisions in the event that the penalty is de-
clared unconstitutional. I s
The second death penalty bill, House Bill 18, was sent to the Gover-
nor's desk on June 30, 1972.19 Although this proposal was more com-
prehensive than House Bill 20 and provided for death in eleven situa-
tions 2 0 Governor Walker surprised many by approving House Bill 18
and vetoing House Bill 20.21 House Bill 18, however, did not escape
the Governor's scrutiny entirely unscathed. The Governor used his
amendatory veto power to incorporate important changes into the Bill.22
First, he reduced the number of situations requiring death from eleven
to seven.23  He excised four categories claiming they were either too
broad or adequately covered by other provisions. Secondly, he delayed
the effective date of the Bill until its constitutionality is ruled upon fa-
vorably.2 4 Thirdly, and most importantly, he altered the actual sen-
tencing procedures. Originally, the Bill had provided that after a finding
of guilt on a murder charge, but before sentencing, the Chief Judge of the
Circuit Court was to appoint a three-judge panel. 25  The panel was to
hear evidence to determine whether the murder fell into any of the
eleven specified categories. At the hearing before the three-judge panel,
the burden was upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the murder fell into one of the eleven categories. If a majority of the
18. If the death penalty or any death sentence is found to be unconstitutional, the
defendant must then be sentenced to a prison term of not less than fourteen years.
H.B. 20, § 1(d).
19. H.B. 18, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973), sponsored by Rep. Henry Hyde
(R.-Park Ridge).
20. Id. § 5-8-A. Murder: 1) of an elected official; 2) of a peace officer or
fireman; 3) of a correctional official; 4) by a person twice convicted of murder;
5) by tampering with water, gas, electricity, etc.; 6) during a hijacking; 7) for
money; 8) by contract; 9) during the course of certain felonies; 10) of a witness;
and 11 ) by a person under a life sentence.
21. Governor Walker vetoed House Bill 20 and approved House Bill 18 on
September 12, 1973, although he did so only after making some changes pursuant
to his amendatory veto power.
22. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(d) for the Governor's unique amendatory veto
power.
23. He removed four categories from the eleven requiring death. These were
murder: 1) of an elected official; 5) by tampering with water, gas, electricity, etc.;
8) by contract; and 10) of a witness.
24. Exactly what this means is unclear. How can a bill be tested until a prose-
cution is brought under it? How can anyone be prosecuted until it becomes ef-
fective?
25. One judge is to be the trial judge if possible.
1973] 519
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panel found that the murder fell into any of the specified categories, no
discretion was allowed, and the sentence must be death.26  Governor
Walker approved this procedure, but he added one additional factor.
Now, the three-judge panel can decide not to impose death even if the
murder falls into one of the seven categories-for compelling reasons of
mercy. The Governor apparently felt that the Bill as written was too
restrictive and did not provide enough flexibility to allow mercy in ap-
propriate cases. 27
Remaining in the Bill is an interesting provision for a two-stage appel-
late review. After the normal review for error, the appellate court is
then required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if the sen-
tence of death was the result of discrimination based on race, creed, sex
or economic status. If discrimination is found, a sentence of life imprison-
ment is to be imposed. This Bill eliminates the provisions in the Uni-
form Code of Corrections for a sentence of death for other Class 1 fel-
onies, but does not remove the wording from the offenses themselves. 28
Finally, as in House Bill 20, it contains provisions in case the penalty
is declared unconstitutional. 29
Illinois has not been the only state to rewrite a criminal code to com-
ply with Furman. In December, 1972, during a special four day ses-
sion, Florida became the first state to actually write a mandatory death
penalty bill for certain types of murder. 80 Although the Florida statute
is similar to House Bills 18 and 20 in many respects, it goes even further
and specifically lists aggravating and mitigating circumstances the sen-
tencing court must consider in determining the sentence: If mitigating
circumstances exist, the defendant may escape the death penalty. The
earlier version of House Bill 20 contained such a feature but was elimi-
nated before passage. The Florida statute may well be the first rewritten
26. The Bill is not entirely clear on exactly who pronounces sentence. Section
9-1(b) suggests that the trial judge does, while section 5-8-JA(9) suggests that
sentencing is up to the three-judge panel. Perhaps the real intent is that the three-
judge panel pronounce sentence of death; otherwise, it goes back to the trial court
for imposition of a prison sentence. But after hearing lengthy arguments on sen-
tence, should not the three-judge panel pronounce sentence in all cases?
27. The Governor felt that the state must provide a procedure for even that
one case where death would be legally required but not morally justified (e.g.,
father of daughter raped by two men finds and kills both men). Perhaps a
manslaughter instruction would be the appropriate remedy. In any event, executive
clemency is available.
28. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 10-2(b)(1), and 30-1(c) (Supp. 1972).
29. See note 18, supra.
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (1973). See also Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's




mandatory death penalty bill to come before the United States Supreme
Court. In July, 1973, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of their new statute."'
As the result of an interesting judicial interpretation, both Delaware8"
and North Carolina 8 also have mandatory death penalty bills. Both
states had the customary two part death penalty provision in their stat-
utes. One part called for a sentence of death for certain crimes and the
second provided that a recommendation of mercy by the jury would re-
duce the sentence to life imprisonment. In both cases, the state supreme
courts held the mercy provisions invalid in light of Furman but went on
to hold that the statutes were severable and thus a mandatory death
penalty resulted-for all capital offenses.
Altogether, seventeen states have redrafted their laws to conform to
Furman. Montana has already sentenced two jail escapees to be hanged
for murder. California, which had more men on death row than any
other state when Furman was decided, has just enacted a capital punish-
ment bill. In perhaps the most bizarre of all cases, a Pennsylvania judge
sentenced a man to death even though that state has no provision for
capital punishment.
In spite of the apparent tremendous popular support for death penalty
legislation, whether any of the attempts will be successful in light of
Furman is a subject of much debate. There is language in Furman to
the effect that mandatory death penalties would be sustained; 4 and there
is also language that they would not. 5 Senators have questioned the
31. State v. Dixon, 13 CRIM. L. RPrR. 2495 (July 18, 1973).
32. State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1972).
33. State v. Waddell, 194 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. 1973).
34. Justice Stewart, concurring in Furman, stated: "[I] cannot agree that
retribution is a constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of pun-
ishment." 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972). Justice White, also concurring, announced:
[I] do not at all intimate that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se
or that there is no system of capital punishment that would comport with
the eighth amendment.
Id. at 310-11.
35. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion in Furman, stated:
Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its face may be applied in such
a way as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Such conceivably might be the fate of a mandatory death penalty. ...
408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972). And Justice Powell, dissenting, said that "Nothing short
of an amendment to the United States Constitution can reverse the Court's judg-
ments." Id. at 462. See 118 CoNG. Ric. H 6477 (daily ed. June 30, 1972), forjust such a reaction.
1973]
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constitutionality of such new measures, 80 as have legal scholars. 87 It is
worth noting that the dissenting justices in Furman may find a manda-
tory death penalty offensive. s8 Interestingly, Stewart v. Massachusetts,3 9
which followed Furman and similarily struck down a sentence of death
was a per curiam opinion with no dissents. The dissenting justices in
Furman were troubled with the break from the long line of cases uphold-
ing the death penalty. 40 But now that the break has been made, they
too may join the present majority when further cases arise.
Notwithstanding the doubts voiced by many scholars, the Furman
opinion leaves the distinct impression that death may be imposed if dis-
cretion is eliminated. 41  The present rash of mandatory death penalty
bills is ample proof of that. The Bill signed by Governor Walker elimi-
nated the kind of obvious jury discretion struck down by Furman.
Whether it eliminated the discretion inherent in our whole system of
criminal justice is another question. 42 Some scholars believe the man-
date of Furman cannot be met until discretion is removed at every level.48
But even if such a sweeping change is not required, House Bill 18 is
open to attack on many fronts.
House Bill 18 attempts to comply with Furman by narrowly defining
the offenses for which death is the sentence. But recently a New York
court struck down a statute that allowed death only for the murder of a
policeman engaged in the performance of his duty. 44 The narrow scope
of the statute did not save it because death was not required in every
instance. Apparently House Bill 18 will not be able to rely only on its
carefully drawn categories in the court test sure to come.
House Bill 18 also leaves some technical questions unanswered. No-
where does it state what type of evidence will be admitted at the sen-
tencing hearing before the three-judge panel. Will all rules of evidence
36. 118 CONG. REc. S 15631-32 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1972).
37. See text accompanying note 5, supra.
38. 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
39. 408 U.S. 845 (1972).
40. 408 U.S. 238, 380-82, 407-08, 417, 467 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
41. See Note, 22 DEPAuL L. REv. 481, 497-98 (1972); Note, 47 ST. JOHN'S
L. R v. 107, 140-41, 146-47 (1972).
42. Discretion is pervasive at all levels: executive clemency, plea bargaining,
lesser and included verdicts, state's initial decision to prosecute, grand jury function,
and quality of defense counsel. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect legislation alone
to eliminate this degree of discretion.
43. See note 5, supra.
44. People v. Fitzpatrick, 13 CuM. L. RPTR. 2277 (June 27, 1973).
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apply, or just some? Exactly who pronounces sentence, the three-judge
panel or the trial court?45 There also seems to be an inconsistency in
the Bill itself. If the Bill is declared unconstitutional, or the murder does
not fall into one of the specified categories, the defendant is sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than fourteen years. If the appel-
late court finds discrimination in the sentencing procedure, the defendant
is sentenced to life imprisonment. Is the remedy for discrimination more
discrimination? Additionally the Bill is not clear on which court an ap-
peal is to be taken. If the Bill requires an appeal to the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court, then this provision conflicts with Supreme Court Rule
60346 which provides for direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court in
cases imposing the death penalty. Moreover, the question arises as to
whether an evidentiary hearing on discrimination is to be held by all
appellate courts, or just the first one. In any event, how will the Illinois
Supreme Court find time for what will surely be a lengthy evidentiary
hearing on discrimination? 47
Perhaps the most important challenge facing the Bill will center on
the provision permitting the three-judge panel not to impose death for
"compelling reasons of mercy." Originally, death was mandatory if the
murder fell into one of the specified categories. Governor Walker then
added this element of discretion that may well lead to the Bill being de-
clared unconstitutional. If Furman did nothing else, it struck down dis-
cretion in applying the death penalty. Some states have attempted to
avoid this problem by explicitly stating the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances a sentencing court may consider. 48  Governor Walker ap-
parently decided this approach would be too restrictive and inserted
some discretion but omitted listing any standard. 49  With no express
standard to apply, each three-judge panel is thus left to determine and
apply its own standard in deciding what constitutes compelling reasons
of mercy. Whether this is a higher degree of discretion or a kind of dis-
cretion that is different from that struck down by Furman is a question
that will only be answered by future court tests.
45. See note 26 and accompanying text, supra.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l1OA, § 603 (1971).
47. The wording of the bill would not seem to allow the use of a "master" to
conduct the hearing.
48. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(3) & (4) (1973); MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 201.6(3) & (4) (Final Draft No. 1, 1961). For an explanation of a proposed
federal bill see 13 CuM. L. RPTR. 2357 (July 18, 1973).
49. Furthermore, such an approach is apparently needless in light of executive
clemency. See note 27, supra.
1973]
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.However, even if the discretion allowed by House Bill 18 is found
to be permitted under Furman, the host of other questions presented by
that Bill may well tie up any prosecution under it for years to come.50
In spite of its technical deficiencies, the legislators are aware that in a
1970 constitutional referendum, Illinois voters favored retention of the
death penalty by over two to one. With that kind of a popular mandate
and the confusion of Furman, Illinois is one of the many states awaiting
the Supreme Court's next word on the death penalty.51
John Joseph O'Malley
50. This assumes that the confusion surrounding its effective date is ended.
See note 24, supra.
51. A constitutional majority was needed to pass the bill as amended. A
three-fifths majority was needed to pass the bill as originally written. ILL. CONsT.
art. IV, § 9. On October 31, 1973, House Bill 18 as amended by Governor Walker
was overwhelmingly approved by the legislature.
